Conflict in Cambodia and Thailand Resumes—With No End in Sight

Joshua Kurlantzick is senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. Annabel Richter is a research associate for southeast Asia and south Asia at the Council.

James M. Lindsay

Weeks after a Trump-negotiated ceasefire fell apart, the two countries seem far from finding another pause in the fighting. In fact, the border conflict is likely to get worse.

Council on Foreign Relations
Article by Joshua Kurlantzick and Annabel Richter

December 1, 2025 4:24 pm (EST) 

A monk stands near a damaged dorm at Thai Niyom temple, which was hit by Cambodian artillery during the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict in Surin Province, Thailand on November 3. Valeria Mongelli/Getty Images

On the sidelines of the October summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) hosted in Malaysia, President Donald Trump and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim looked on as representatives from Cambodia and Thailand signed a joint declaration [PDF] that has come to be known as the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords. Trump, whose attendance of the summit seemed to hinge heavily on the prospect of presiding over the heavily-publicized peace deal—on top of hashing out new bilateral trade deals—appeared to enjoy the pomp and circumstance of the accords signing.

Barely two weeks later, however, an explosion in Thailand’s Sisaket Province, which borders Cambodia, seriously wounded four Thai soldiers. On November 10, Thailand suspended the ceasefire, and neither side has appeared motivated to bring the conflict to an end since. This has left the border between the two countries tense and dangerous—a situation that is unlikely to change.

The accords were supposed to solidify the resolution of active conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over contested areas of their 500-mile-long shared border. Longstanding tensions over territory claimed by both countries had erupted into five days of full-fledged fighting in July, killing  more than forty people, driving tens of thousands of people out of their homes, and empowering the Thai military by creating a spike in nationalism in Thailand. 

Following the fighting in July, there were several rounds of ceasefire negotiations facilitated by Chinese, Malaysian, and U.S. officials. Prior to the signing of the “peace accords” on October 26, representatives from Bangkok and Phnom Penh had already committed to a “halt in fighting” during a special meeting on July 28 in Malaysia.

But even back in July there were signs the ceasefire would not hold in the long-term. The Thai army accused Cambodian forces of violating the terms of the truce only hours after the special meeting, prompting a secondary convening in Shanghai on July 30 to reaffirm the two countries’ “commitment to the ceasefire consensus.”

In the intervening time, the atmosphere along the border remained tense but without large-scale hostilities. The two countries even produced a draft thirteen-point pathway towards demilitarization of the contested Preah Vihar temple complex and surrounding border areas, which lies in Cambodian territory. Thus the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords in October seemed to represent the next logical step towards long-term de-escalation.

The October agreement’s delineation of several crucial interim objectives such as the planned release of eighteen Cambodian prisoners of war, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from contested areas, new mine-clearing procedures, and the establishment of a politically-neutral observation team to monitor the disputed border all seemed to augur well for the future.  

But that hopeful veneer collapsed days later. As Japhet Quitzon and Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted shortly after the conflict restarted: “Tensions flared further after shots were exchanged between Cambodian and Thai soldiers on November 12, which Phnom Penh said killed a Cambodian civilian. Thailand that day cancelled the planned release of captured Cambodian soldiers. In a press conference on November 17 the Thai ministry of defense presented evidence that landmines along the border were newly planted, not left over from previous conflicts as alleged by Cambodia. Phnom Penh continues to deny that it placed new mines.”

Now, there appears little prospect for a return to a ceasefire. In fact, the border conflict is likely to get worse.

The Thai military has little reason to tone down the conflict, as it empowers the armed forces, in advance of an upcoming March parliamentary election in the kingdom. By continuing to bolster nationalism, the armed forces may hope that that their actions boost support for pro-military parties in March, and prevent the progressive People’s Party (PP), from winning an absolute majority.

Cambodia also has little desire to withdraw. It fears looking weak, given almost universal anger among the Cambodian population about the ceasefire failure, which most in the country blame on Thailand. Meanwhile, the leadership in Phnom Penh has cultivated closer ties with the White House this year, after decades of isolation by the United States. Cambodia may hope that, if Thailand is viewed as the country that essentially ended the ceasefire—a deal touted by Trump—the U.S. administration may move even closer to Cambodia while stonewalling Thailand. The only challenge there: Thailand is a U.S. treaty ally and much bigger U.S. trading partner.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the authors. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.