Purges culled the loyal: expert

Editorial by School of Vice

In effect, by merely choosing to opt out of the Vietnamese Indochinese blueprint, the Pol Pot faction had already "antagonised" their erstwhile comrades in arms to no end. It wasn't so much the B52 bombings by the US to disrupt the Vietcong supplies line along the dense jungle in the eastern parts of the country in the 1960s - often cited as a crucial factor in fueling the KR movement - that had been decisive in transforming the fortune of the conflict and turning a few hundreds of Vietminh trained guerrillas into a credible fighting force, strong enough to eventually topple the US-backed Lon Nol forces. Rather, it was the organisation, discipline, structure, arms, training and active military involvement of the Vietminh and their presence in strategic locations throughout the country that ultimately gave rise to the KR movement. In fact, the Pol Pot leadership only requested the Vietnamese withdraw their combatants from Cambodia towards the closing stages of the war, and indeed the leadership feared the involvement of their Vietnamese 'ally' in securing the final victory and end to the war of "liberation" would have denied [or sullied] the Cambodian faction its historic role in the struggle and given Hanoi - as conquerors - the upper hand in shaping the nation's future and foreign policies, as indeed, this had ironically proved to be the case following the Vietnamese overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in 1979. 

Regardless of the role Pol Pot himself had played in the mass killings of Cambodians, he was right to bemoan this hegemonic scheme of the Vietnamese, insisting "they always seek to thwart the will of the Kampuchean people". What worried and 'antagonised' the Vietnamese leadership even more over their rebellious, KR allies was the speed with which the Chinese armed DK's conventional fighting forces, culminating in the construction of a military airbase in Kg Chhnang and Hanoi's decision to quell the development and prevent it from becoming a greater threat by mounting an armed invasion. 

It is also worth noting that Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea had barely stopped fighting Lon Nol's forces in April 1975 before finding itself sucked into armed clashes on two fronts simultaneously - Thailand in the west and Vietnam in the east. Whilst the confrontation in the west had not led to a Thai military invasion of DK-ruled Cambodia, this was not the case with the KR's much cited military 'provocations' against Vietnam in the east. This tragic reality and pattern of being squeezed between two far more powerful and dominant neighbours had not of course ended with the fall of the Pol Pot regime, and the country would find itself in familiar predicaments once more over Preah Vihear in the west and a series of territorial disputes in the east, with the Phnom Penh regime's refusal to do anything more than trying to cover up the eastern border dispute, issuing formal diplomatic complaints and pleas to Hanoi, as well as locking up border critics and harassing concerned activists a pronounced indication of its impotence and founding origins as Hanoi's compliant instrument. 

We shall see whether China's growing influence over, and backing for, her Cambodian ally will have resulted in similair historical patterns being repeated. China is not what she was in the seventies - economically, politically or militarily - and her regional and global stake and influence could be a critical factor in helping her Cambodian ally become an important strategic regional player as she [China] seeks to turn Cambodia into an attractive 'model' for others in the region to follow, whilst military and geopolitical considerations could also transform this small nation into a formidable launchpad, outpost and stepping stone of China's spreading presence and ambitions - reminiscent of the backing Washington gives to its Israeli ally in the Middle East. That - for good or ill - will be the ultimate test of Beijing's resolve and long term commitment towards Cambodia.

Whatever the future may hold, don't bet against the Vietnamese trying [and succeeding] yet again in derailing any regional scheme her powerful northern neighbour wants to put in motion ...

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Expert witness Stephen Morris gives his testimony before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia yesterday during Case 002/02. ECCC

Thu, 20 October 2016

Andrew Nachemson

ppp

Morris, who was granted unprecedented access to archives of Soviet communications with Hanoi, testified that Vietnamese communists had hoped Nuon Chea would help overthrow the Khmer Rouge, with Vietnamese General Secretary Le Duan going so far as to refer to him as “our man” and a “personal friend”.

Expert witness Stephen Morris offered a nuanced view of the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict during the Khmer Rouge era yesterday, reiterating his belief that Vietnam intended to control the Cambodian communist movement, but also noting that Cambodian forces antagonised the Vietnamese prior to the 1979 invasion.

Khmer Rouge leaders Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan are on trial for various crimes against humanity, including genocide against the Vietnamese, as well as internal purging of their own officers. Defence teams have long argued that the purges were a reaction to a legitimate attempt by Vietnam to overthrow the Cambodian government.

While Morris once again testified yesterday that the Vietnamese had hoped to control communism in Indochina in the 1970s, he also maintained that the Khmer Rouge purges had largely targeted loyal party members.

“The Vietnamese set up Cambodian communist structures, which they tried to dominate with their own Khmer Viet Minh agents, but Pol Pot and other leaders were aware of this strategy,” Morris said.

By around 1975, the researcher continued, almost all of these Vietnamese agents had already been removed from power.

“The purges and terror campaigns which took place after 1975 branded people who were loyal members of the system,” Morris said, calling Pol Pot “paranoid” and accusing him of conducting a “campaign of terror within party leadership”.

Morris, who was granted unprecedented access to archives of Soviet communications with Hanoi, testified that Vietnamese communists had hoped Nuon Chea would help overthrow the Khmer Rouge, with Vietnamese General Secretary Le Duan going so far as to refer to him as “our man” and a “personal friend”.

However, Morris said, these hopes were “groundless”.

Morris also testified that Vietnam had a far superior military and could have easily crushed the Khmer Rouge much earlier than 1979, but instead tried to negotiate with the regime, even while Khmer Rouge soldiers were slaughtering Vietnamese civilians.

Communications from the same Soviet archives between Le Duan and the Soviet ambassador seem to confirm this desire.

In October 1977 – just two weeks after a Cambodian raid into Vietnamese territory – Le Duan noted that Vietnam had the capability to “rout” Khmer Rouge forces, but that their response was to display patience and attempt to find a peaceful resolution.

Morris also said that one of the primary reasons Vietnam did not invade Cambodia earlier is because it was “impossible politically”.

When they finally did take Phnom Penh in 1979, he added, Vietnam went far beyond what the international community desired.

“Vietnam didn’t simply overthrow the regime; they occupied the country for 10 years and tried to create a regime in their own image in Cambodia.”