Prince Sihanouk with Son San on his visit to one of the border camps in the eighties.
Editorial by Khmer Circle
During the Vietnamese armed occupation of Cambodia in the eighties there had been formed a number of anti-Vietnamese resistance groups that called themselves 'front' or 'national front' as in the case of the country's former Prime Minister Son San's 'Khmer People's National Liberation Front' or KPNLF. It's been noted by some that at least one of these 'fronts' had in fact been planted [or infiltrated] - near the Thai-Cambodian border region - by the Vietnamese as a mole within the resistance camp. This one specific group, however, had operated less like a fighting unit in the national cause and more like a band of unruly bandits whose name was synonymous with gang raping of vulnerable female refugees and civilians who happened to pass through their controlled territory as well as robbing their victims off precious belongings found on their bodies on their precarious trek to the UN supervised refugee border camps.
If the opposition CNRP had been a potent and powerful 'weapon' for the democratic cause before its recent illegal dissolution by Hun Sen and his ruling CPP, then that dissolution may not have necessarily rendered this weapon ineffective or impotent. The real strength and appeal of the CNRP lie in the Khmer people's perception of, and trust in, its unflinching commitment to the national cause and its known past record. This is the strength that Hun Sen cannot and will never be able to undermine or dissolve except by means of subversion as mentioned above and or by high jacking the opposing party's leadership as witnessed by the destruction and death of Funcinpec or by other means of social division as in the creation and sponsorship of small puppet political groups and elements with the sole aim of weakening and undermining that appeal and trust people place in the main opposition movement. This is the reason why we have urged the need for mass activism and mobilisation of the country's masses because ideas, agendas and principles do not by themselves deliver social change without their execution and implementation through social activism and action.
In recent years and decades, long- established authoritarian rules have in the main been toppled through non-violence or peaceful mass civilian protests and, often as in most countries affected by these uprisings, the involvement and switching sides of the armed forces onto the side of the people have been the main tipping points for regime change.
Charisma and reputation help in attracting mass support and preserve that widespread appeal among the followings and the rank and file of any liberation 'front' or movement but these ingredients are even far more critical for today's circumstances and international climate where military tyrants fear the galvanised mood of the people far more than they do their opponents' tanks or weapons and, with good reasons! A Pol Pot or a Ho Chi-minh could even opt to stay in the shadow and let their 'organisation' force-conscript civilians at gun-point into its rank to increase and consolidate influence and control but, needless to say, this is hardly a practical option for the CNRP’s leadership! Thus, the human-moral character of leaders and leadership - appeal or 'charisma' - and the picture of unity or disunity the party projects vis a vis the people is of indispensable consideration and asset.
In itself there is little wrong with the CNRP even in its present form and, if it were [wrong] then the CPP would not have dissolved it and would not have done everything in its power to throttle the movement post-dissolution. In effect, the merger of the two political parties formerly led by Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy has already formed a unified "Front" for the democratic cause but in name. Creating another 'front' will make poor sense as this is likely to be counter-productive for among other things it will create even more room for petty in-fighting and squabble within the anti-CPP struggle, rank and leadership. If the 'front' is 'a broad church' that attracts elements who may or may not share the current CNRP leadership's core principles and agenda then it's hard to envisage it doing anything to empower the movement as a whole. Quite the contrary.
In the armed resistance 'coalition' of the eighties, the three main factions of Sihanouk, the KR and Son San had provided a more 'unified' and combined fighting front against a common foe as its focus and target. Even so, it had always been expected to be nothing more than a temporary expedient measure or a 'marriage of convenience' for the factions in terms of the prudent purpose of claiming diplomatic recognition and obtaining international support, leaving the respective armed groups to do things their own ways in their administered areas and on chosen battle fronts. Some critics even pointed out that the 'coalition government in-exile' itself did not even coalesce on important policies or strategies!
Note that the creation of the 'two Prime Ministers' system in the aftermath of the Funcinpec election win of 1993 also turned out in the end to be a complete and utter disaster for not only one of the Prime Ministers - Rannariddh as 'First Prime Minister' - but also for the country's main opposition force at the time and this short-lived forced marriage of convenience would subsequently work to deny the Khmer people's hope of ridding their nation of tyranny, foreign hegemony and the yearned for return to national independence and democracy. A precious, golden opportunity gone by...
If the opposition CNRP had been a potent and powerful 'weapon' for the democratic cause before its recent illegal dissolution by Hun Sen and his ruling CPP, then that dissolution may not have necessarily rendered this weapon ineffective or impotent. The real strength and appeal of the CNRP lie in the Khmer people's perception of, and trust in, its unflinching commitment to the national cause and its known past record. This is the strength that Hun Sen cannot and will never be able to undermine or dissolve except by means of subversion as mentioned above and or by high jacking the opposing party's leadership as witnessed by the destruction and death of Funcinpec or by other means of social division as in the creation and sponsorship of small puppet political groups and elements with the sole aim of weakening and undermining that appeal and trust people place in the main opposition movement. This is the reason why we have urged the need for mass activism and mobilisation of the country's masses because ideas, agendas and principles do not by themselves deliver social change without their execution and implementation through social activism and action.
In recent years and decades, long- established authoritarian rules have in the main been toppled through non-violence or peaceful mass civilian protests and, often as in most countries affected by these uprisings, the involvement and switching sides of the armed forces onto the side of the people have been the main tipping points for regime change.
Charisma and reputation help in attracting mass support and preserve that widespread appeal among the followings and the rank and file of any liberation 'front' or movement but these ingredients are even far more critical for today's circumstances and international climate where military tyrants fear the galvanised mood of the people far more than they do their opponents' tanks or weapons and, with good reasons! A Pol Pot or a Ho Chi-minh could even opt to stay in the shadow and let their 'organisation' force-conscript civilians at gun-point into its rank to increase and consolidate influence and control but, needless to say, this is hardly a practical option for the CNRP’s leadership! Thus, the human-moral character of leaders and leadership - appeal or 'charisma' - and the picture of unity or disunity the party projects vis a vis the people is of indispensable consideration and asset.
In itself there is little wrong with the CNRP even in its present form and, if it were [wrong] then the CPP would not have dissolved it and would not have done everything in its power to throttle the movement post-dissolution. In effect, the merger of the two political parties formerly led by Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy has already formed a unified "Front" for the democratic cause but in name. Creating another 'front' will make poor sense as this is likely to be counter-productive for among other things it will create even more room for petty in-fighting and squabble within the anti-CPP struggle, rank and leadership. If the 'front' is 'a broad church' that attracts elements who may or may not share the current CNRP leadership's core principles and agenda then it's hard to envisage it doing anything to empower the movement as a whole. Quite the contrary.
In the armed resistance 'coalition' of the eighties, the three main factions of Sihanouk, the KR and Son San had provided a more 'unified' and combined fighting front against a common foe as its focus and target. Even so, it had always been expected to be nothing more than a temporary expedient measure or a 'marriage of convenience' for the factions in terms of the prudent purpose of claiming diplomatic recognition and obtaining international support, leaving the respective armed groups to do things their own ways in their administered areas and on chosen battle fronts. Some critics even pointed out that the 'coalition government in-exile' itself did not even coalesce on important policies or strategies!
Note that the creation of the 'two Prime Ministers' system in the aftermath of the Funcinpec election win of 1993 also turned out in the end to be a complete and utter disaster for not only one of the Prime Ministers - Rannariddh as 'First Prime Minister' - but also for the country's main opposition force at the time and this short-lived forced marriage of convenience would subsequently work to deny the Khmer people's hope of ridding their nation of tyranny, foreign hegemony and the yearned for return to national independence and democracy. A precious, golden opportunity gone by...
1 comment:
First thank you school of vice for your brilliant point of view about the "Front".
93 Years Old Woman
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