Mending Fences: Vietnam and Cambodia’s Diplomatic Reset

 

Khmer Circle: 

"Mending fences" is a diplomatic way of putting it and is entirely in line with how Vietnamese diplomacy operates, especially, with their subjugated "neighbours" - Laos and Cambodia. 

Geographical needs, maintaining peaceful neighbourly relations and co-operation and even intermarriage arrangements that would cement and sabotage the ruling families and courts of these smaller nations have all been underlying intentions and practices of Vietnam's scheming elite. Pol Pot himself when in power had attended to this tripartite gathering in Hanoi or a tea meeting with Uncle Ho. Sipping this tea during a friendly, jovial chat with Uncle Ho could determine the ultimate fate of the invitee shortly afterwards as Pol Pot and many of Ho's own comrades had discovered during and after Ho's lifetime.

Also lets see if Hanoi could 'mend fences' with their other neighbour to the north - China - or even summon Xi Jinping to this regular pep talk or tea meeting. After all, the Chinese and the Vietnamese have been 'neighbours' for a lot longer than either of them have been with the people of Laos and Cambodia.

^^^   

Published 13 Mar 2025 Fulcrum

Nguyen Khac Giang

 

The Ho Chi Minh City Summit signals a pragmatic reset in Vietnam-Cambodia relations, driven by economic interests rather than ideology. Successful cooperation would bring the added advantage of enhancing their collective bargaining power with external actors and strategic flexibility as the great power competition intensifies.

On 22 February 2025, a quiet diplomatic breakthrough unfolded in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet and his father, Hun Sen, the powerful chairman of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), travelled by road to Vietnam’s southern metropolis — pointedly not to Hanoi, the political capital nearly 2,000km away. Awaiting them was an unprecedented delegation: Vietnam’s Communist Party General Secretary To Lam, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, and almost the entire Politburo, who had made the two-hour flight south. This carefully orchestrated summit, later joined by Laotian leaders, marked the first trilateral Indo-Chinese gathering in three years and signals a recalibration of Vietnam’s approach to its western neighbours.

The venue spoke volumes. The Independence Palace, formerly known as Norodom Palace (named after Cambodia’s royal dynasty), provided a symbolic backdrop acknowledging Cambodia’s historical significance. By meeting in HCMC — just 200km from Phnom Penh — Vietnam demonstrated new flexibility in its regional diplomacy, which normally involves others having to travel to Hanoi for this type of summit. The unprecedented dispatch of virtually the entire Politburo outside the capital underscores the importance Vietnam now attaches to rebuilding this relationship.

 

This reset follows a period of bilateral unease. Cambodia’s deepening ties with China, manifested in the controversial Funan Techo Canal project and the rapid development of Ream Naval Base, had raised eyebrows in Hanoi. More unsettling was Cambodia’s unilateral withdrawal from the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA) in September 2024. This two-decade-old initiative, proposed by Hun Sen himself, had been a cornerstone of Vietnam’s regional integration strategy. The withdrawal came as Vietnam was preparing for the next CLV-DTA summit and amid a sensitive leadership transition following the death of long-time leader Nguyen Phu Trong in July 2024.

Rather than taking the path of public confrontation, Vietnam’s response has been strategically measured. In the past eight months, To Lam has met with Hun Sen thrice, alongside meetings with Hun Manet and King Norodom Sihamoni. This diplomatic blitz culminated in the HCMC summit, which broke from tradition by including prime ministers alongside party leaders, signalling that practical cooperation, not merely ideological solidarity (like Vietnam’s ruling party, the CPP has communist roots), is now the priority.

Unsurprisingly, economic integration dominated discussions, particularly the planned expressway connecting HCMC and Phnom Penh. The expressway, which is expected to be completed in 2027, will halve the travel time between the two cities, currently around five hours. A railway linking the cities was also proposed, though plans remain inconclusive. Additionally, both sides discussed facilitating cross-border trade and investment.

The emphasis on economic cooperation strikes the right chord for Cambodia, particularly after recent setbacks in Chinese-backed infrastructure projects exposed the limitations of Cambodia’s China-centric strategy. Vietnam’s geographic proximity and integrated supply chains naturally complement Cambodia’s economy. Vietnam ranks among Cambodia’s biggest trade partners — bilateral trade reached US$10 billion in 2024, representing 20 per cent of Cambodia’s total trade. That nearly doubled the US$5.31 billion recorded in 2020. Both sides aim to double the 2024 figure soon.

Geography makes the two countries permanent neighbours; pragmatism demands that they cooperate despite past differences and present challenges.

For Vietnam, cordial neighbourhood relations serve the security and economic purposes of To Lam’s “National Rise” agenda. Cambodia and Laos represent extensions of Vietnam’s economic space — destinations for Vietnamese investment, sources of inputs, and partners in building a resilient regional network. Deeper integration creates economies of scale that enhance each country’s position in global supply chains and attract new investment opportunities. On security, Hanoi and Phnom Penh, along with Vientiane, agreed to strengthen defence ties and protect each other’s “legitimate interests” in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment. Specifically, they agreed not to let any other “external powers” use one’s territory against the other — an indirect reference to China — and to further collaborate in dealing with non-traditional security threats such as human and drug trafficking.

The summit comes at an opportune moment as leadership transitions in Vietnam and Cambodia create space for relationship renovation. Hun Manet, representing a younger generation, may be seeking to diversify his country’s international relationships beyond the China-centric approach of recent years. As he once noted, Cambodia desires to “breathe through its own nose” — a metaphor originally referring to Vietnam but equally applicable to relations with China. In addition, unlike his father, Hun Manet does not have a personal link with Vietnam, which makes it easier for him to seek a more pragmatic and equal relationship with Hanoi. For Vietnam’s part, To Lam is a pragmatist who prioritises efficiency over ideology, preferring business deals to historical reminiscence.

The renewed engagement, however, is not without challenges. Historical grievances and public suspicions, particularly in Cambodia, could undermine partnership efforts. China’s growing influence creates obstacles for both sides in rebuilding trust. For Vietnam, the test will be whether this high-profile summit can be translated into sustained policy measures: greater transparency on projects like the Funan Techo Canal and Ream Naval Base and continued cross-border infrastructure investment. Such concrete steps would be conducive to the forging of trust between the new leaderships.  

The HCMC summit represents Hanoi’s pragmatic response to a shifting geopolitical landscape. By engaging Cambodia on terms that emphasise economic interdependence and mutual security rather than historical ties, Vietnam has signalled its willingness to adapt. Geography makes the two countries permanent neighbours; pragmatism demands that they cooperate despite past differences and present challenges.

As transport links between HCMC and Phnom Penh — both the expressway under construction and a proposed railway line — take shape, they symbolise new connectivity, physical and diplomatic. The ability to reset and recalibrate relationships is not merely desirable for both nations; it is essential for ensuring long-term stability and development. Success would bring not only accelerated development in border regions but also strategic returns — enhanced collective bargaining power with external actors and greater strategic flexibility amid intensifying great power competition.

2025/89

Nguyen Khac Giang is Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was previously Research Fellow at the Vietnam Center for Economic and Strategic Studies.