Susannah Patton
An international dispute that is all about domestic politics.
Thailand’s Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra at a press conference on 19 June following the leak of her phone call with Cambodia’s Hun Sen (Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP via Getty Images)
Published 20 Jun 2025
The Interpreter
Cambodia Thailand
Cambodia Thailand
"Hun Sen had every incentive to leak the call (he admits sharing it with
80 Cambodian officials): sticking it to Thailand is popular and
distracts attention from Phnom Penh’s weakness vis-à-vis its other major
neighbour, Vietnam."
As wars in the Middle East and Europe intensify and take on new dimensions, and as a ceasefire holds between India and Pakistan, an old struggle on the Thai-Cambodia land border risks adding to the list of inter-state conflicts.
Like many conflicts, the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, over the area of land that surrounds the sprawling Angkor-era Preah Vihear temple complex, has its roots in contested colonial era mapping. While the International Court of Justice ruled in 1962 that Preah Vihear belonged to Cambodia, 195 kilometres of the land border to the north of the complex are yet to be demarcated.
The dispute flared up most recently between 2008 and 2011, when Cambodia applied to list the temple on the UNESCO World Heritage register. This poured fuel on the flames of anti-government protests in Thailand, speeding the downfall of the Thaksin Shinawatra-controlled government. The resulting Democrat Party administration led by prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva then took a hard line on Cambodia (which provocatively had appointed Abhisit’s nemesis Thaksin as economic advisor). Bloody skirmishes continued between 2008 and late 2011, when both sides agreed to withdraw troops from the disputed area. This agreement was aided by Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa’s shuttle diplomacy.
So why has the dispute flared up again in 2025, nearly 15 years later?
On the surface, observers might reasonably have hoped that a return of the Shinawatra family to Government House in Bangkok would see friendly ties, given the close connections between Thaksin and Hun Sen (Thaksin’s niece even married into Hun Sen’s inner circle). This might have been the case, if the Shinawatra dynasty were in a better domestic political position in Thailand. But as I wrote last year, current Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra (Thaksin’s daughter, a 38-year-old political novice) must manage an unwieldy and fractious coalition, with the ever-present risk of undemocratic intervention from the country’s conservative forces.
Like many conflicts, the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, over the area of land that surrounds the sprawling Angkor-era Preah Vihear temple complex, has its roots in contested colonial era mapping. While the International Court of Justice ruled in 1962 that Preah Vihear belonged to Cambodia, 195 kilometres of the land border to the north of the complex are yet to be demarcated.
The dispute flared up most recently between 2008 and 2011, when Cambodia applied to list the temple on the UNESCO World Heritage register. This poured fuel on the flames of anti-government protests in Thailand, speeding the downfall of the Thaksin Shinawatra-controlled government. The resulting Democrat Party administration led by prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva then took a hard line on Cambodia (which provocatively had appointed Abhisit’s nemesis Thaksin as economic advisor). Bloody skirmishes continued between 2008 and late 2011, when both sides agreed to withdraw troops from the disputed area. This agreement was aided by Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa’s shuttle diplomacy.
So why has the dispute flared up again in 2025, nearly 15 years later?
On the surface, observers might reasonably have hoped that a return of the Shinawatra family to Government House in Bangkok would see friendly ties, given the close connections between Thaksin and Hun Sen (Thaksin’s niece even married into Hun Sen’s inner circle). This might have been the case, if the Shinawatra dynasty were in a better domestic political position in Thailand. But as I wrote last year, current Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra (Thaksin’s daughter, a 38-year-old political novice) must manage an unwieldy and fractious coalition, with the ever-present risk of undemocratic intervention from the country’s conservative forces.
In this context, it seems highly plausible that the current skirmish – which saw the death of a Cambodian soldier last month – was in some way directed or encouraged by anti-Shinawatra forces in Thailand. These groups had already been loudly complaining about the prospect of Paetongtarn selling out her country’s interest in negotiations on the two country’s overlapping maritime claims in the Gulf of Thailand.
A march organised in support of the Cambodian government’s actions in its recent border dispute with Thailand, in Phnom Penh on 18 June (Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP via Getty Images)
Paetongtarn’s inexperience has been on full display this week, with the leak of a phone call between her and former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, who still calls the shots in Cambodia from his dual position as Senate President and father of current prime minister Hun Manet. In the call, Paetongtarn criticised the local military commander in Thailand as a political opponent and repeatedly asked for Hun Sen’s support to deescalate, making her look weak. Hun Sen had every incentive to leak the call (he admits sharing it with 80 Cambodian officials): sticking it to Thailand is popular and distracts attention from Phnom Penh’s weakness vis-à-vis its other major neighbour, Vietnam.
It seems unlikely that Paetongtarn will survive this episode. She has since claimed the tone taken in the call was a negotiating tactic. Thai prime ministers have been pushed from office for far lesser offences (one, for participating in a cooking show). And Paetongtarn’s coalition was already crumbling, with kingmaker party Bhumjai Thai pulling out over a dispute about who should control the powerful Interior Ministry. Whether Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai Party can front another prime minister and hold the coalition together until elections are due in 2027 seems highly uncertain. But it is also unclear what government could replace it, given the composition of the parliament.
As for the situation on the border, there are reasons to be concerned. Several developments could make the conflict less manageable than in 2011.
For one, Cambodia has been the recipient of large-scale Chinese military assistance over the past decade, meaning it may feel more confident to push more assertively against its larger neighbour. Second, social media has heightened scrutiny and inflamed sentiment on both sides, making compromise more difficult. And finally, in 2025, there is no “Pak Marty” to help mediate the conflict; Indonesia’s foreign minister is a close personal aide of President Prabowo, not a professional diplomat. Prabowo’s own level of interest is unknown.
Thailand, as the larger country, has economic levers it can pull and its restrictions on border crossings have irked Cambodia, which has threatened retaliatory action. It argues the two countries should pursue de-escalation through the bilateral joint border commission, a bureaucratic committee focused on managing border issues. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s tactic is to appeal again to the International Court of Justice, having experienced success in that forum in 1962 and 2013.
How the conflict unfolds depends largely on Thai domestic politics. As long as Pheu Thai limps on in government, inflaming the Cambodia dispute will remain a tempting goal of conservative political opponents. Meanwhile Hun Sen, as ever, appears to continue to outsmart and outlast his opponents. He seems to have read the political tea leaves in Thailand correctly and decided the Shinawatra connection is expendable.
It seems unlikely that Paetongtarn will survive this episode. She has since claimed the tone taken in the call was a negotiating tactic. Thai prime ministers have been pushed from office for far lesser offences (one, for participating in a cooking show). And Paetongtarn’s coalition was already crumbling, with kingmaker party Bhumjai Thai pulling out over a dispute about who should control the powerful Interior Ministry. Whether Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai Party can front another prime minister and hold the coalition together until elections are due in 2027 seems highly uncertain. But it is also unclear what government could replace it, given the composition of the parliament.
Social media has heightened scrutiny and inflamed sentiment on both sides, making compromise more difficult.
As for the situation on the border, there are reasons to be concerned. Several developments could make the conflict less manageable than in 2011.
For one, Cambodia has been the recipient of large-scale Chinese military assistance over the past decade, meaning it may feel more confident to push more assertively against its larger neighbour. Second, social media has heightened scrutiny and inflamed sentiment on both sides, making compromise more difficult. And finally, in 2025, there is no “Pak Marty” to help mediate the conflict; Indonesia’s foreign minister is a close personal aide of President Prabowo, not a professional diplomat. Prabowo’s own level of interest is unknown.
Thailand, as the larger country, has economic levers it can pull and its restrictions on border crossings have irked Cambodia, which has threatened retaliatory action. It argues the two countries should pursue de-escalation through the bilateral joint border commission, a bureaucratic committee focused on managing border issues. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s tactic is to appeal again to the International Court of Justice, having experienced success in that forum in 1962 and 2013.
How the conflict unfolds depends largely on Thai domestic politics. As long as Pheu Thai limps on in government, inflaming the Cambodia dispute will remain a tempting goal of conservative political opponents. Meanwhile Hun Sen, as ever, appears to continue to outsmart and outlast his opponents. He seems to have read the political tea leaves in Thailand correctly and decided the Shinawatra connection is expendable.
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