Sihasak's posturing, bullying rhetoric and arrogance more than anything else perfectly encapsulate the Gang of Three - i.e. Palace, Government, Army or Four if one includes their media mouthpieces and Thailand's cyber army of trolls online! - and their dealings vis a vis Cambodia since their initiated attacks last year.
Envisage a situation where a man violently raped a girl next door (his neighbour's wife or daughter) at her most vulnerable moment. After the deed he held a knife at her, threatening to kill her and her family members and take more of her properties such as house, lands etc. unless she kept her silence about her ordeal. He also added for good effect that it was moreover in her interest and honour as a girl/woman to keep it between him and her!
Well, that is exactly what this Gang of Three are treating Cambodia at this moment. That’s what the term ‘bilateral’ really means to the Thais and in reality even though they have just unilaterally torn up the MOU with Cambodia which was the only practical bilateral framework or mechanism on offer for resolving overlapping maritime boundary claims!
-Social media
After the Thai Cabinet terminated the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU 44), Cambodia began shifting the maritime dispute from a stalled bilateral framework into the more structured arena of international maritime law by announcing its move toward UNCLOS compulsory conciliation.
During a trilateral sideline meeting facilitated by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and attended by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, Thailand reportedly acknowledged Cambodia’s position to pursue compulsory conciliation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding overlapping maritime claims, according to a high-ranking official.
However, on 11 May 2026, Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow rejected Cambodian media reports claiming that Thailand had already agreed to UNCLOS compulsory conciliation. The response also appeared intended to counter Cambodian media narratives, such as Fresh News and Khmer Times, etc.
Beyond Cambodian media, Khaosod English also reported on 6 May that Prime Minister Anutin confirmed a move toward a common legal framework after Cambodian leader Hun Manet announced plans to use compulsory conciliation.
Notably, Foreign Minister Sihasak used very careful wording. He did not state in absolute terms that Thailand would never enter UNCLOS compulsory conciliation with Cambodia. Instead, he attempted to reposition Thailand as the actor controlling the diplomatic process by emphasizing that “the process must begin with sincere bilateral talks.”
This language is politically important domestically. Some Thai nationalist groups that supported the termination of MoU 44 may perceive any movement toward compulsory conciliation as a sign of weakness by the Anutin government, particularly if it appears Thailand is simply following Cambodia’s initiative. In this regard, according to The Nation Thailand, Sihasak also stated that Cambodia and Thailand could consider other mechanisms under UNCLOS if bilateral negotiations fail.
This leaves strategic flexibility because Thailand can still eventually participate in compulsory conciliation while framing the move as a last resort after bilateral negotiations prove unsuccessful.
From a legal perspective, Sihasak’s broader point partially makes sense. Maritime boundary disputes are generally not expected to jump directly into third-party mechanisms without attempts at negotiation first. Under Article 298 of UNCLOS, compulsory conciliation may apply when states have failed to reach an agreement within a reasonable period of negotiations.
However, the minister’s additional statement, that the process “could not proceed unless both Thailand and Cambodia agreed to it”, is more questionable. That interpretation appears to confuse compulsory conciliation with other consensual dispute-settlement mechanisms. Compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS is specifically designed so that one party may initiate the process if the legal conditions are met, even without the other side’s political consent.
At most, Thailand could challenge whether the conciliation commission has jurisdiction or competence over the case. But this would not be a total rejection of the process, and it would function more as a delaying strategy.
A clear example is the Timor-Leste v. Australia Conciliation Case, where one state initiated compulsory conciliation under Article 298 and Annex V of UNCLOS despite the other side’s reluctance. Australia initially objected to the commission’s competence, yet the Commission rejected Australia’s objections and held that it was competent to continue the conciliation proceedings.
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